E-Afghan

20 april
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19 april
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پاکستان منبع تروریزم در دنیا

افغانستان در مشت پاکستان است، این یک سیاست جالب پاکستان است که در چهل سال اخیر به پیش میبرد، در شروع وقتی که مردم افغانستان بر ضد اتحاد شوروی و دولت وقت قیام کردند پاکستان چانس خود را یافت. با استفاده از رهبران مجاهدین یا اشرار شهر های افغانستان را یکی بعد از دگر با راکت های کور، بمب های جابجا شده در بس ها، ماین های تعبیه شده در سرک ها و حمله های چریکی هدف قرار داد. وقتی که دولت وقت سقوط کرد و بیرق های مجاهدین در کنار بیرق های پاکستان در شهرهای افغانستان بلند شد پاکستان چانس تاریخی خود را به دست اورد وبا تمام نیرو زیر بناهای افغانستان را به واسطه مجاهدین از بین برد، تا حدی که استخوان های مرده ها را از قبر ها بیرون کرده و در پاکستان از ان پلاستیک ساختند. در زمان طالبان حتی لین های تیلفون افغانستان از طریق پاکستان میگذشت و هیچ طالبی بدون اجازه پاکستان حتی اب خورده نمیتوانست. در زمان طالبان افغانستان یکایالت دگر پاکستان شد. در 14 سال اخیر که دنیا از پاکستان دال خور و دست درازی شان به ممالک دگر غیر از افغانستان خسته شدند، چونکه تا وقتی که فقط خون افغان ها میریخت هیچ مملکتی در دنیا با پاکستان مشکلی نداشت، دست پاکستان از افغانستان کم کم کوتاه میشود. حال پاکستان مانند گاو پیر که کنجاره خواب میبیند دوباره به فکر احیای قدرت خود در افغانستان است. برای پاکستان مهم است که چهره جنگ و افغانستان جنگ زده هر هفته ای در فکر مردم دنیا باشد چونکه هیچ مملکتی در دنیا حاضر نیست که در یک کشوری که هر هفته در پایتخت ان بمب ها انفجار میکند سرمایه گذاری کند. حال باید خاد افغانستان با کمک هند با استفاده از مشکلات داخلی پاکستان ان کشور را مجبور کند که دست از تروریزم بردارد

09 mars
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28 januari
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لیست فساد در جهان

برای دیدن لیست کامل ممالک دنیا بر مبنای فساد به لینک زیر فشار دهید

corruption_perceptions_index_2015_report_embargo

21 januari
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Självmordsattentat mot Tolo Tv journalister!

TOLO-Tv-Staff1. Mohammad Jawad Hussaini

2. Zainab Mirzaee

3. Mehri Azizi:

4. Mariam Ibrahimi

5. Mohammad Hussain

6. Mohammad Ali Mohammadi

7. Hussain Amiri

 

I gårdagens attack mot Tolo tv dödades 7 journalister. Än så länge är det som alltid tyst från Sveriges håll att fördöma attacken.

Detta är inte en attack mot några journalister utan en attack mot yttrandefriheten i ett hårt drabbat land.

10 december
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Rahmatullah Nabil chef för Afghanska säkerhetstjänsten NDS skriver om attacken mot Kandahar flygplats

Översättning av e-afghan.com

Hämtad från Rahmatullah Nabils Facebook sida:

nabil

Jag är ledsen!

I den stunden där Nawaz Sharif (pakistansk president) i dagens konferens (Heart of Asia) deklarerade återigen att Afghanistans fiender är våra fiender (läs pakistansk), precis i den stunden våra oskyldiga afghanska landsmän i boenden nära Kandahars flygplats, i Helmands distrikt Khanshin, i provinsen Takhar och i provinsen Badakhshan blev martyrer och fick sina halsar avskurna och minst 1000 liter blod av våra landsmän spilldes som motsvarar färgen på den röda mattan som vi (president Ghani på besök i Pakistan fick röda mattan framför sig) gick Cat Walk på. Men de människor som var med oss på den konferensen och i talibanernas namn från ISI (pakistansk ökände säkerhetstjänst) kontors datorer från Quetta meddelade att det var talibanerna som skapade den här stoltheten (attacken). Vi blev så skraja eller glada av de 21 kanonskott att vi accepterade: att vi än så länge har utfört 41 attacker mot pakistansk fiender och för att övertyga våra 60 åriga vänner (60 år sedan Pakistan skapades av England) att snart kommer vi att starta stora operationer mot Mulla Fazilullah (Pakistan påstår att han gömmer sig i Afghanistan). Detta trots att Mullah Fazilullah befinner sig i ISI:s gästhus och i Pakistan i månader och år och är en del av ISI:s projekt. Trots att i denna stund Mullah Akhtar Mansoor (talibanernas ledare) befinner sig i Bypass i Quetta med pakistanska säkerhetsvakter och planerar framtida attacker för att döda fler i Afghanistan och detta i närvaron av överste Rana (från pakistansk armé) under psydonymen Rabbani. Och Sarajudin Haqqani (känd som Khalifa sahib) den terroristen och fiende till Afghanistan var med på sin sons omskärelse festen i Hayatabad i Peshawar (ska vara Afghansistans vän).

Vad hände med vår 5000 årig historia! att den historia knäade framför en 60 årig historia!

(Tack och lov att jag inte är där)

Rahmatullah Nabil (chef för Afghanistans säkerhetstjänst NDS)

 

 

متأسفم! همان لحظه يى كه نواز شريف در كنفرانس امروز يك بار ديگر اعلان كرد كه دشمن افغانستان دشمن پاكستان است! همزمان در همان لحظه هموطنان بيگناه ما در فاميلى هاى ميدان هوايي قندهار و ولسوالى خانشين هلمند و تخار و بدخشان و و به شهادت ميرسيدند و ذبح ميشدند و كم از كم يك هزار ليتر خون هموطنان بيگناه ما كه به يقين معادل رنگ سرخ همان قالينى است كه ما بالايش قدم هاى ( كت واك) گذاشتيم بودند! اما همان كسى كه در مجلس با ما ها حضور داشت و به نام طالبان از كامپيوتر هاى دفترش يعنى آى اس …آى از كويته اعلان كردند كه اين افتخار را طالبان آفريدند، اما! ما ها با فير ٢١ توپ هوايي آنقدر هراسيديم و يا هم ذوق زده شديم كه قبول كرديم ! كه ما تا بحال ٤٠ حمله/ عمليات بر ضد دشمنان پاكستان انجام داديم و به زودى جهت اطمينان خاطر دوستان شصت ساله مان عمليات وسيع را عليه ملا فضل الله اغاز مينماييم! در حاليكه ملا فضل الله از ماه ها و سالها در پاكستان و مهمانخانه هاى اى اس اى در پاكستان به سر ميبرد و جز پروژه هاى آى اس آى است. در حاليكه همان لحظه اختر منصور در منطقه باى پاس كويته با داشتن محافظين اى اس اى، مصروف نقشه كشيدن و پلان گذارى هاى بعدى جهت كشتار هاى بيشتر در افغانستان به حضور داشت كرنيل رانا به اسم مستعار رباني بود! و سراج الدين  حقانى (خليفه صاحب) در مراسم ختنه سورى تروريست (دشمن افغانستان!!!) يعنى پسرتازه تولد شده از خانم سومى اش در حيات آباد پشاور پاكستان ( دوست افغانستان) در محفل با شان و شوكت نه چندان متفاوت از صالون هاى طلائي و زمردى و لاجوردى و مرمرى و هيروينى و سمارت سيتى و و و ما اشتراك داشت!

دا زما ٥٠٠٠ كلن تاريخ سه شو؟ چى د ٦٠ كلن تاريخ په مقابل كى په گوندو شو!

اى ابر سياه تو هم به روزگار من ميمانى، يا مولا دلم تنگ آمده، شيشه دلم اى خدا زير سنگ آمده!

( شكر زه نه يم په كى)!

27 oktober
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Pakistan Used Militant Proxies To Counter India in Afghanistan: WikiLeaks

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OF KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM

Findings

There is no United States Government (USG) comprehensive strategy being implemented in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AF-PK) region. No commitment of troops, funds, or effort in Afghanistan will eliminate the threat to the United States without a comprehensive strategy that encompasses efforts in Pakistan to eliminate al Qaeda and the Taliban insurgency emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The FATA safehaven fuels the Afghan insurgency and is a strategic threat in its own right because it enables al Qaeda to organize, train, and plan operations against the United States homeland and against our allies. While such a comprehensive strategy for the region may exist, no one in Washington or on the ground with whom we spoke, including our ambassadors, is aware of it. Rather, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, well-intentioned individuals in various elements are working in their own lanes and mission sets, yet nothing ties their efforts together as a whole for an achievable victory. Further, the current relationships among foreign entities operating in Afghanistan, including the United States and its departments and agencies, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the United Nations (UN), and a host of other nations, are not conducive to a unified execution of the USG effort. U.S. personnel point to disparate priorities that sometimes have resulted in counter-productive actions and programs that have not always been tailored to local conditions. In short, the greatest contributor to the USG‘s failure to achieve stability in the region thus far has been uncoordinated activity. All USG personnel in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in Washington with whom we spoke consistently expressed this concern.

Recommendation 1: The USG must develop and coalesce around a comprehensive strategy designed to meet a set of clearly defined goals for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.True to basic counterinsurgency (COIN) principles, the strategy needs to be regional in breadth, locally tailored and adhered to by all USG elements in-theater. Currently, none of these three principles are being followed well by USG elements in the region.

Recommendation 2: The USG must first clearly define and prioritize America’s regional goals in order to formulate the comprehensive regional strategy and to guide its implementation. These prioritized goals will serve to guide decision-making in the event of anticipated resource constraints and will allow for all U.S. elements in-theater to find common purpose in their missions and in what the USG is trying to achieve. We suggest that America‘s primary goal is to eliminate the terrorist threat to the United States emanating from terrorist sanctuaries in the region and to replace those sanctuaries with secure environments maintained through stable governance in order to prevent their reversion to terrorist safe-havens. We believe other regional interests like nuclear non-proliferation and economic concerns should be addressed in the regional strategy as well. Additionally, we encountered a number of classified examples demonstrating the need to bring our efforts together while in-theater that can be discussed in person.

Recommendation 3: In order to implement the comprehensive regional strategy, the in-coming President should appoint and actively support a Washington-based Special Coordinator for USG efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President should resist the temptation to try to replicate the success in Iraq through the efforts of a senior military commander in-theater. The Afghanistan problem spans the border with Pakistan and cannot be solved in a single country context. A Special Coordinator position is necessary in the AF-PK case to bring USG regional efforts together. The Special Coordinator‘s mission will be to bring USG efforts under the overall strategy, solicit and maintain international support, interface with our European partners and regional stakeholders to garner support for funding, troops, and potentially diplomatic compromises, and communicate difficult messages to regional players when necessary so that our country teams and military leaders maintain high rapport with their counterparts in-theater. The Special Coordinator must have more authority than a deputy National Security Advisor in the White House and must transcend Department of Defense (DoD) and civilian agency structures. Anything less than a Special Coordinator actively backed by the President would likely just add to the bureaucracy. As a means to integrate better DoD and civilian efforts under the Special Coordinator, a high-level active duty military officer should be considered to serve as the Special Coordinator‘s deputy.

PAKISTAN

Findings

Coalition forces have won every major battle with the Afghan insurgents, but these tactical successes have not resulted in a strategic victory, largely because insurgents are free to retreat and regroup in sanctuaries across the AF-PK border in the Pashtun tribal belt of Pakistan. Pakistan‘s FATA and eastern Afghanistan blend together in many areas. In 1893, the British forced the ruler of Afghanistan to come to agreement under duress to demarcate the border between Afghanistan and what is now Pakistan. Tribal groups span both sides of this ―border,‖ known as the Durand Line, but they do not recognize it as a legitimate boundary, resulting in conflict on both sides of the border. Further, Pakistan‘s army is not organized, trained, or equipped to deal with the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism mission the border conflict presents.

Efforts in the FATA have been challenged by Pakistan‘s ambivalence toward, and perhaps outright support for, the Taliban. While the U.S. Intelligence Community differs on the extent of the relationships, at least some elements of Pakistan‘s military and intelligence services appear to be ambivalent about the anti-Taliban and anti-militant mission in the FATA, in part due to their history of close ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan‘s conflict with the Soviet Union and Pakistan‘s use of militant proxies in its conflict with India. Pakistan‘s desire to counter India‘s growing influence in Afghanistan and concerns about U.S. long-term commitments to Afghanistan increase Pakistan‘s interest in hedging its bets by ensuring that it will be able to have a working relationship with the Taliban to balance Indian and Iranian interests if the United States withdraws. Concerns about Pakistani resolve have prompted suggestions that the USG increase unilateral action, but the USG needs Pakistani cooperation to eliminate the threat from the FATA and cannot afford to lose Pakistani support for our efforts in Afghanistan. Eighty percent of our logistical support for the forces in Afghanistan transits Pakistan and there currently is no viable land alternative. After the September 3, 2008, U.S. military raid into Pakistan, Islamabad temporarily halted all fuel shipments to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan. A permanent halt of fuel or other shipments would significantly damage coalition operations in Afghanistan.

Recommendation 4 The USG must dramatically increase our engagement with Pakistan to develop a partnership toward meeting U.S. and Pakistani goals for the region. The Special Coordinator, appointed by the President, should work with Pakistan to determine what it wants in exchange for genuine and measurable progress against terrorists and insurgents in the FATA, including the provision of effective and fair governance to the FATA. The USG should continue to offer as much training and assistance to Pakistan as it will accept, but that assistance should be oriented toward assisting the Pakistani military in retooling itself for the COIN mission. As part of the Special Coordinator‘s outreach to Pakistan, the USG should commit to judicious use of unilateral action in the FATA, employing it only when targeting America‘s highest priority threats. In return, the Coordinator should seek acknowledgment from Pakistan that recognition of its sovereignty over the tribal areas requires Pakistan to prevent attacks from that territory on other sovereign nations. Recommendation 4.1 As part of the engagement process, the next administration should begin an intensive diplomatic effort to develop solutions to conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neuman recommends that the USG work to encourage AF-PK to agree that the current frontier will not be modified without the consent of both governments and their peoples. This would help officially recognize the actual situation, without forcing the Afghan government to compel its people to agree to a border they do not want. As part of this effort, the Special Coordinator should look for ways to alleviate Pakistan‘s concerns about India‘s influence in Afghanistan. 4

LOCALLY TARGETED SECURITY, GOVERNANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT

Findings

Representatives from several U.S. government agencies noted that food, shelter, and water are the most important items, after security, that we could provide, yet our priorities on the ground are somewhat misguided in providing them. This often occurs due to a disconnect between what is needed in a particular area and what the federal or provincial authorities determine to build there.

Furthermore, unity of command and effort is lacking in AF-PK—both civilian and military. Particularly in Afghanistan, many USG operations and programs are often unknown to other USG agencies and departments, and they are not coordinated to ensure local buy-in. On the military side, forces do not seem to agree on common rules of engagement, and each element is not sufficiently equipped, trained, and logistically supported for a common military purpose. The inability of many coalition troops to carry out the COIN mission and the lack of sufficient indigenous forces means that there simply are not enough troops who can carry out the ―clear‖ and ―hold‖ missions in the ―clear, hold, build‖ strategy. A spillover effect of inadequate troop levels is that military operations have relied heavily on airpower as a force multiplier. The collateral damage which results from continuous and increasing air strikes is wearing on the Afghan public and is causing anger among the very population coalition forces are trying to protect. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan stated that the United States must reduce the number of civilian casualties. We cannot retain the support of the Afghan population if they perceive themselves as victims of our efforts.

On the civilian side, no single nation or international organization sets, articulates, or represents the policies and civil efforts of over 40 nations, the UN, the World Bank, the European Union, and numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the region. The approach adopted for Afghanistan in 2002, in which each lead nation took responsibility for a certain sector (Germany for the Afghan National Police (ANP), Japan for demobilizing militias, Italy for the judicial sector, the United States for the Afghan National Army (ANA), and the United Kingdom for counternarcotics), has failed to yield adequate resources or effective multinational collaboration. The Afghanistan Study Group noted that, with few exceptions, no lead nation has devoted the necessary attention or money to its sector, and no lead nation has assumed responsibility for economic development.

1 Economic development policy was intended to be the purview of the new Afghan government, working in conjunction with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)—civil-military units designed to provide governance and development assistance in semi-secure environments—but the Afghan government has not been capable of coordinating donor efforts and the PRTs lack an overarching concept of operations that serves USG and NATO strategic goals. The result has been that the efforts of the 26 Afghanistan Study Group, Revitalizing Our Efforts, Rethinking Our Strategies, January 2008, p. 20. 5  PRTs are disparate, vary greatly in structure and function, are uncoordinated, and have a mixed record of success, particularly in targeting the needs of Afghan locals. In short, we have failed to recognize that the mission to eliminate the terrorist threat from Afghanistan is broader than we originally anticipated and we have failed to adjust accordingly, in military or financial terms. As noted by Bruce Riedel in August 2007, ―we have tried to rebuild a country devastated by a quarter century of wars, invasion, and terror on the cheap. If we continue on this path, we will surely fail. Bruce Riedel, How to Tackle Rising Instability and Insurgency in Afghanistan, August 23, 2007. 3 Samina Ahmed, Pakistan and Afghanistan – Prospects for Stability, May 2008.

Recommendation 5: The USG must secure the support of traditional local leaders to make progress in the areas of security, development, and governance and must encourage those leaders to spearhead those efforts to the greatest extent possible. The new U.S. Special Coordinator should work with the Afghan Government in reviewing the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), prioritizing its projects and garnering international financial and military support for implementing them in a more coordinated fashion. At a minimum, the U.S. Special Coordinator could bring together USG and U.S. NGO cooperation as much as possible to work with local leaders to meet their needs. As more development projects begin on the Pakistani side of the border, the U.S. Special Coordinator should work with the Pakistani government to ensure as much coordination as possible.

Security

Findings

Afghanistan is larger in area and population than Iraq but has far fewer international troops and indigenous security forces. The number of indigenous security forces trained in Iraq is approximately 545,000, while Afghanistan, nearly four times the size of Iraq, has a target of only 200,000 total Afghan security forces. Even with recent improvements and force level increases, the current and projected Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) end state is inadequate to secure stability. The ANA has only 67,000 troops with a current target of 80,000 (due to increase to 122,000). The ANP is severely underfunded, undertrained, and poorly equipped. Additionally, the Afghan populace views the police as predatory and corrupt vice a source of protection.  Nonetheless, Afghan security forces are one of the major components to winning the war. Additionally, not all of the 47,000 NATO troops are effective for the security mission in Afghanistan. Many NATO nations sent troops to Afghanistan presuming that the mission would be peacekeeping and reconstruction, rather than fighting an insurgency. The mission of NATO in Afghanistan has become a test of the alliance’s political will and military capabilities. The inequity of burden-sharing in combat operations remains an important point of contention in the alliance. Forces from the United States, Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands, which are deployed in the east and south, bear the brunt of the fighting. Current non-US NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan are in many cases woefully inadequate and under-resourced for the task. Some are poorly trained or not trained in the skills necessary to conduct operations in the brutal Afghan environment. Many are casualty averse and lack COIN force enablers such as helicopters and UAV support, human source intelligence, civil affairs and special operations units,5 and their own logistics. Congressional Research Service, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, October 23, 2007 5 General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret), Memorandum regarding Visit to NATO SHAPE Headquarters and Afghanistan, 21-26 July 2008, July 30, 2008, p. 5. 6 James Phillips and Lisa Curtis, The War in Afghanistan: More Help Needed, April 17, 2008, p. 6.

Several NATO nations have barred their soldiers from operating in high-threat environments and engaging in dangerous missions. Others prohibit their troops from participating in combat operations except for self-defense. Germany, for example, has 3,300 well-trained troops in Afghanistan, most of whom are deployed in what has been a relatively quiet area of northern Afghanistan. German troops patrol only in armored personnel carriers and do not leave their bases at night. ―The de facto segregation of coalition forces into ‗frontline‘ and ‗stand aside‘ units has undermined NATO‘s effectiveness, flexibility and unity of purpose‖ and undermines the credibility of NATO as a modern war-fighting alliance. The ANSF, under USG oversight, have greater opportunities for strategic success than international forces alone. For example, when U.S. forces go into an area and incur collateral damage, the public out-cry and media attention is dramatic and covered widely in Afghan and international press; this sets back the overall USG effort. Conversely, when Afghans cause collateral damage it is more acceptable and resulting problems often can be settled quietly. Additionally, ANSF have the ability to pose as insurgents in order to infiltrate enemy areas, as they have started doing, multiplying opportunities for ―soft‖ take-downs. Building a competent ANSF is the best long-term and cost-effective solution for achieving stability in Afghanistan, but the current security force training effort by the USG is inadequate. According to the Commander of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, who is responsible for training the ANSF, embedded trainers, mentors, and advisors are insufficient in number for the task. Additionally, some National Guard and Reserve soldiers are ill-suited to the training mission. In addition to training, the ANA needs transport aircraft to move troops and vehicles around the country quickly, along with attack and heavy lift helicopters, and better logistics, medical, and engineering capabilities.

Recommendation 5.1 As part of the new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, the coalition should ensure that appropriate forces are matched to corresponding missions. A major goal of the strategy should be to train effectively a large contingent of Afghans who can be responsible to ―hold and build.‖ This effort will require an increase in U.S. 7

ground forces (and international forces which do not have caveats, or are willing to remove them) primarily to train and grow a much larger ANA and a larger, effective, and non-corrupt ANP (the ANP piece will take more time). Afghan security forces must be put in the lead as much as possible, employing them in the pursuit of USG objectives. An increase in U.S. troops and ANSF will help reduce the reliance on air power and will enable increased security along transportation routes, the Pakistani border, around Kabul, and gradually in other areas. In addition to the Department of Defense, other USG elements and resources should be used to support Afghan security efforts to clear and hold critical areas threatened or influenced by insurgents.

Recommendation 5.2 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander should shift the missions of NATO members who maintain caveats due to their own domestic politics or who prove ineffective at ”holding” to more appropriate missions where their ineffectiveness is not counter-productive to the overall effort. Codifying the division of NATO forces into ―front line‖ forces and ―stand aside‖ forces may not be in the long-term interest of NATO, but doing so in the short-term will help achieve USG objectives in Afghanistan.

Development

Findings

As noted earlier, economic development policy is in disarray. For example, currently USAID development projects are approved at the district level where district Governors consult with U.S. advisors and send a list of proposed projects to the Provincial Technical Working Group. The Group sends the list to the Development Council, and the Governor and PRT decide which projects should be funded. This often results in a disconnect between the needs of locals and the desires of the Governor and PRT. In one area we visited, we observed a multi-million dollar unfinished ―road to nowhere‖ cut into the side of a mountain. The project was constructed at considerable risk to the U.S. engineers who took fire during its construction. When asked why the project was started and then left unfinished, the answer was telling. The Army built the road because President Karzai asserted that roads were a high priority in Afghanistan. The Army thought that a road in this particular area would help the locals get crops to market and thus contribute to their economic well-being. The problem was that the locals were subsistence farmers and did not want or need a road—they wanted a well for clean drinking water. Because the Army built something the locals did not want, the locals did not protect it. Rather, they allowed the Taliban to come to the area and take shots at the engineers until the Army realized the project‘s futility and stopped construction.

In addition, development funds are insufficient to meet needs in Afghanistan and international donors, in many cases, have not met their funding commitments. Bruce Riedel of Brookings noted that ―instead of a massive economic reconstruction aid effort akin to the Marshall Plan of the 1940s, Afghans have gotten less economic aid on a per capita basis than Haitians or Bosnians. Targets of opportunity to provide development funds emerge following military ―clearing‖ efforts and windows of opportunity often open to reward leaders who have agreed to renounce the insurgency. USG commanders and the U.S. Ambassador need discretionary funds for immediate initiation of such projects.  Bruce Riedel, Interview given to Shakila Khalje, How to Tackle Rising Instability and Insurgency in Afghanistan, August 23, 2007.

Recommendation 5.3

The USG needs to distribute development funds at the local level or directly to contractors and vendors while giving the Afghan government the public credit for aid projects. Such a development model works as follows: the USG employs trusted, indigenous personnel to interface with locals in a given locale to ascertain the true need of the community; the indigenous USG controlled personnel interface with the Afghan government to approve the project and then allow the government to announce to the community that the government has secured the project for the local area. Next, the USG either directly pays the contractors or transfers funds to the government and closely monitors their direct transfer to the contractors. This system allows for better control and accountability of U.S. funds, while allowing the Afghan government to take the credit for the projects, thereby increasing the public trust. It also allows the Afghan government to claim credit for achieving objectives linked to the Afghan National Development Strategy, and gives the locals what they really need, making them more apt to protect the aid project from the militants.

Recommendation 5.4

The U.S. Special Coordinator should convene a development board to coordinate USG efforts and to assist aid agencies not under USG control in implementing the coordinated plan. Additionally, if the PRT model is to continue, officials on the ground agreed that a District Reconstruction Team (DRT) model would have greater success than a conventional PRT because a DRT would be closer to the populace and, therefore, closer to the problems. Decentralized decision-making on aid projects would eliminate delays in meeting needs on the ground and allow our forces to respond better to local needs. Congress should amend chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, to establish permanently the Commanders‘ Emergency Response Program to provide funds for urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs in the field. The authority should extend both to the U.S. Ambassador and to regional military commanders.

Governance and Rule of Law

Findings

The Afghanistan Study Group notes that the Afghan government and international community have focused on high profile events, such as elections and the new constitution, ―but the difficult work of creating a strong system of central government and provincial governance that enables and empowers accountable actors has been lacking. These events, while significant, have not led to a government capable of providing essential services or extending its writ throughout the nation. Due to the more than 20-year civil war, the pool of educated professionals available to lead and staff government positions is small. In addition, Kabul‘s unwillingness or inability to deal with corruption and the government‘s reliance on weak and predatory local leaders who do not have legitimacy in much of the country are contributing in large part to the citizens‘ declining faith in democracy and to the growth of the insurgency. For governance initiatives to succeed, the Taliban must be replaced by a combination of police, local security, courts, and government services at the local level, and the government must deal with endemic corruption. This will not be easy. As noted earlier, the police are insufficient in number and quality, and corruption is a systemic element within Afghan society. Ensuring the success of the National Justice Sector Strategy and the National Justice Program requires oversight and, in the provinces, better coordination of effort. To that end, the UN has established provincial justice coordination as a way to deconflict rule of law activities by international donors. Department of State officials believe that the Afghan government needs to be more forceful in demanding performance from the donors and in conducting sound oversight of rule of law efforts. The detention component of rule of law is also in need of drastic change. None of the 203 district detention facilities in the 34 provinces meet international standards. The number of prisoners in the Afghanistan corrections system is on the rise (from 4,000 in 2004 to 12,000 in 2008) and prisoners routinely carry cell phones and knives. There is also no present capacity to segregate prisoners, often leaving children mixed in with adult offenders, including cases where a mother is incarcerated and her children accompany her to prison. Furthermore, the records systems for detainees are so poor that prisoners are often held beyond their imposed sentences or are released inadvertently. In addition, security is problematic as evidenced by the escape of 870 fugitives, including 390 Taliban militants, from the main prison in Kandahar in June 2008. Afghanistan Study Group, Revitalizing Our Efforts, Rethinking Our Strategies, January 2008, p. 27.

Recommendation 5.5

The Department of Justice (DoJ) should serve as the federal government’s lead agency for the rule of law mission to draw upon its unique expertise and extensive contacts and liaison with the Department of State and local law enforcement. The Department of State would ensure that DoJ’s rule of law efforts fit seamlessly into the overall reconstruction and stabilization effort. The DoJ also would be responsible for ensuring effective joint, interagency and multinational coordination. DoJ‘s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, which was able to work dramatically to reduce corruption in Indonesia over a period of years, should be expanded in Afghanistan. Efforts to pay fair salaries to police, prosecutors, defense counsels, and judges should be pursued to help reduce the lure of corruption. Congress should fund the Civilian 10

Stabilization Initiative on the condition that DoJ is provided with funding and personnel necessary to implement effectively the rule of law mission. At least one service judge advocate, who is not presently serving as a command or assistant command judge advocate, should be assigned as a dedicated rule of law attorney to each PRT in Afghanistan. As the nation-wide system is rolled out, the more remote and tribal areas should be allowed to continue traditional tribal justice practices until the federal government has a strong enough presence in the area to implement and emplace its rule of law components. If rule of law efforts outstrip basic security and governance efforts, the initiative will be counter-productive; hence, gradual implementation locale-by-locale is crucial.

Narcotics-Agriculture

Findings

America‘s interest in Afghanistan‘s narcotics industry stems from its bankrolling of the Taliban and its corrupting influence on the Afghan government. The trafficking of Afghan drugs provides financial and logistical support to a range of criminal organizations, militia commanders, corrupt officials, and extremist groups that continue to operate in and around Afghanistan. Former Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte told Congress in January 2007 that ―the drug trade contributes to endemic corruption at all levels of government and undercuts public confidence.‖10 Former ISAF Commanding General Dan McNeill stated, ―When I see a poppy field, I see it turning into money and then into IEDs, AKs, and RPGs.‖11 Successful counternarcotics campaigns in the Andes, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, and India have taught us that a balanced and coordinated effort is the only way to achieve sustainable reductions in drug production. Congressional Research Service, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, December 6, 2007, p. 1. 10 John D. Negroponte, Unclassified Statement for the Record. Annual Threat Hearing of the Director of National Intelligence before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 11, 2007. 11 General Dan McNeill, Remarks to the press in Kabul, Afghanistan, January 2, 2008. 12 Congressional Research Service, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, December 6, 2007, p. 11. 13 Thomas A. Schweich, Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, October 4, 2007. 14 Fighting the Opium Trade in Afghanistan: Myths, Facts, and Sound Policy, Joint Statement by the US and UK, March 2008.

Shortly after the 2001 Bonn Conference, the United Kingdom was designated as the lead nation for international counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Working closely with the Governments of Afghanistan and Britain, the 2007 U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan was adopted as U.S. policy.13 To date, however, these efforts have yielded mixed results.

The Afghan government and the international community agree that forced, targeted, non-negotiated eradication of the fields owned by the wealthy land owners is a necessary law enforcement and counterinsurgency activity. Still, there exists a great opportunity for the Department of Agriculture to address agro-development needs in the AF-PK region as part of a comprehensive strategy to reduce narcotics growth and to increase development. Afghan farmers need agriculture experts to help them think through how best to develop sustainable agriculture in their specific locales. A notable model is the success of the Missouri National Guard in Nangarhar Province, where Missouri farmers with agriculture expertise were able to go in as Guardsmen providing their own security, while teaching locals how to increase crop production. There are numerous agriculture opportunities in Afghanistan. The USAID agriculture representative in Afghanistan said that spices and orchard and vine crops do well in Afghanistan and bring in more money, but they require an extensive market infrastructure and years to develop. For example, pomegranate trees are highly coveted in Afghanistan and there is a market for them in Afghanistan and overseas. Afghanistan exported 50,000 tons of pomegranates to India last year, yet the Indian market could absorb one million tons. Despite this promising opportunity, the agriculture representative noted that ―an investment in tree crops is an investment in the future,‖ which most Afghans cannot afford, especially if they are concerned that the Taliban will continue to grow in strength and will burn down their investment. U.S. officials believe that an extensive road-building effort in the locales that can move beyond subsistence farming is imperative to modernize the country‘s economy, but protecting farmers from militants is a necessary first step toward any long-term agro-development effort.

Recommendation 5.6 The U.S. Special Coordinator should work closely with and help enable British and Afghan counternarcotics elements. Interdiction efforts should focus on the trafficking networks, and eradication efforts should be led by Afghan forces with coalition forces in a supporting role. Attacking the networks would impact the Taliban, corrupt officials, and international drug traffickers more than the farmers, and putting an Afghan ―face‖ on eradication efforts would lend credibility to Kabul‘s counternarcotics efforts.

Recommendation 5.7

The Department of Agriculture should partner with agriculture universities, agro-business, and other agriculture experts to form teams to help Afghan locals with sustainable agriculture development.

The teams could serve within PRTs, or within National Guard or other units, that will protect them and take them to areas where they can add significant value to development efforts underway.

Recommendation 5.8

The USG should pay farmers to plant alternatives, such as vines, orchards, or spices, during the three to five year period required to get an initial harvest, in an effort to encourage them not to plant poppy.

This would not be a ―pay not to plant system‖ and would need to be closely monitored to ensure that the farmers are planting alternative crops. To the greatest extent possible, Afghan security forces must offer protection to the farmers in protecting their crops from 12

Taliban or drug lords, but it remains the responsibility of the farmers to nurture and cultivate the new crops

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Findings

Real opportunities exist for public diplomacy in AF-PK, yet no one has taken the lead for the United States in this area. Complicating such an effort is the lack of a comprehensive strategy with a tailored message to communicate. In Afghanistan today, even on a tactical level, USAID, the DoD, and other agencies have some very good news stories to tell, but in many cases they operate under ISAF controlled PRTs outside the focus of the U.S. Embassy. The State Department has a representative at these PRTs, but there is no indication that they work closely with the Embassy public diplomacy officers to ensure coordination. In other areas, they are limited to press releases which are largely ineffective in a mostly illiterate society. The U.S. Embassy Public Affairs Officer in Kabul relayed that 95 percent of public diplomacy in Afghanistan is in the form of press releases. In Afghanistan, the Embassy could coordinate efforts to build upon the work of the DoD and USAID. For example, both USAID and the Embassy have programs which train and assist Afghan journalists, and USAID has established and funded dozens of Afghan radio stations. However, there is no coordinated effort to ensure that they are not duplicative, nor is there an attempt to use these programs to leverage new ones. In Pakistan, on the heels of the Marriott Hotel bombing and the recent murder of 60 tribal elders in Orakzai, a rare opportunity exists for break-through public diplomacy efforts, primarily through encouraging and supporting Pakistani-generated messaging against the terrorist threat. Pakistani journalists and thinkers are finally becoming more vocal against militant Islamists. While not necessarily favorable to the United States, they are open to assistance in promoting their message of moderation. The Public Affairs Officer in Islamabad has recently submitted a comprehensive proposal to the Department of State on new efforts to support the anti-militant message, to include media support, exchanges, and engagement.

Recommendation 6

The U.S. Special Coordinator should include in the comprehensive regional strategy, a strategic communications plan, coordinated with the Departments of State and Defense, USAID, and other USG public diplomacy offices.

The strategy in Afghanistan should emphasize the theme of ―Afghans solving problems, with international and U.S. support.‖ Public diplomacy efforts in Pakistan should be heavily resourced and should include the support of Islamist reformers, the launch and funding of moderate sympathizers‘ media campaigns, and an overall budgetary increase in International Military Education and Training as well as university and cultural exchanges. 13

TWO RECOMMENDATIONS TO AVOID

There are two recommendations we have come across during our research that we strongly reject. First, is the ―go it alone‖ philosophy, of which some believe they see evidence due to increasing U.S. cross-border attacks into the FATA. The USG had considerable leeway and international support in the early years of Operation Enduring Freedom and could have pursued cross-border scenarios at that time. In 2002, it may well have been better to ask forgiveness than permission, and the world would likely have ―forgiven.‖ Now, however, seven years into the conflict, and facing a much different international situation, the United States cannot afford to push Pakistani and international opinion to the brink with ever-increasing cross-border incursions. Pakistan controls the USG‘s only viable supply line into Afghanistan. Pakistan‘s parliament recently expressed strong disapproval of such U.S. actions in their sovereign territory. Even if President Zardari and military officials were willing to turn a blind eye to U.S. actions privately, it is not worth the strategic loss in overall Pakistani and world opinion. U.S. cross-border incursions should be reserved for only the top high-value targets.

Second, is the current refrain of ―just send more troops.‖ This should only be heeded under a new comprehensive strategy. Sending more troops into the USG‘s current modus operandi in the region is a recipe for following the Soviet model to disaster in the 1980s. More troops only make sense under a new comprehensive strategy for the region.

CONCLUSION

The USG must adjust expectations for its efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan and gain long-term public support. The in-coming President should initiate a media campaign to communicate his vision of USG efforts in the region. Success in Afghanistan and Pakistan is achievable, but many changes will come gradually and progress throughout the region will be unequal. For example, as we were told on the ground, in northeastern Afghanistan in Naray Province and in Pakistan‘s Bajaur Agency it is not uncommon for a young boy to strike a teenage girl and tell her to get back to work. In such hardened, remote tribal areas, change will not occur overnight. The American people need to be aware that a number of efforts they would like to see furthered entail a long-term commitment in the region.

Finally, there are a number of other findings and recommendations embedded in our research on this problem set. A number of Pakistan-specific initiatives not mentioned in the above recommendations also must be addressed within the regional strategy. We stand ready to work collaboratively with all parties on this vital national security imperative and to work on your behalf to resource appropriately the way ahead.

26 augusti
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10 augusti
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Asharaf Ghanis presskonferens om attacker mot Kabul, översatt på engelska

Translation of Remarks by President Ashraf Ghani at Press Conference

August 10th, 2015

Kabul, Afghanistan

In the name of Allah, the most merciful, the most compassionate Dear compatriots, over the last few days, we witnessed to some significant developments in our county and the region. The war methods have changed against Afghans. The peace process is facing new questions. Furthermore, our people need to know where the Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are heading. I would like to further discuss these issues.

At the very outset, I would like to pay my heartfelt tributes and prayers to all those killed in the recent terrorist attacks and condolences to their families. I also wish a quick recovery for all those injured.

You must recall that we and those who are informed of the situation in our country and region had predicted that this year would be the most difficult of all since the Bonn process. The reason is clear. The withdrawal of over 100,000 highly equipped international military forces plus the transfer to Afghan forces of the entire responsibility to counter threats – a development that was not unforeseeable. International observers had predicted that Afghanistan may not be able to deal with this new situation even for a few days. Our enemies had been waiting for a power vacuum so they could take advantage of and see the government collapse. However, none of the gloomy predictions turned to reality. The enemies were disappointed. Our defense and security forces quickly filled in the gap left behind by the international forces and defeated the enemies on all fronts. Let me express my deepest gratitude to our brave sons and daughters in uniform for all the sacrifices they are making.

On the political ground, a recent significant development was that Mullah Omar was not alive. It was our intelligence agency which confirmed the death of Mullah Omar and revealed the lies and fabrications. This confirmation not only demonstrated the strength and maturity of our intelligence agency, but also reaffirmed the fact that the war in Afghanistan is fought for and by others and that the so-called Amir-ul-Momenin, who apparently led and commanded the war, might not have even existed.

Terrorism is a vast and a widespread concern. The terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and other Muslim countries are of the same nature. These attacks pursue no goals but to collapse states and state system in the region. This was for this particular reason that a grand gathering of Muslim scholars in the city of Makkah condemned these attacks. As I reaffirmed it in the Shanghai Summit in Russia, we will continue to make every effort to overcome this phenomenon, and to build a regional consensus for effective cooperation to that end.

The recent series of attacks in Kabul and other provinces show that the war has changed shape. The enemy who was fighting to gain some territory and to claim a victory has now had its backbone broken. It is so desperate now that it has turned to cowardly attacks against innocent people just to weaken people’s morale.

In my conversation last night with Pakistan’s Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff, I made it clear that the government of Pakistan should have the same definition of terrorism in regard to Afghanistan, just as it has for its own. During my visit to Pakistan last November, we affirmed our full commitment for peace and made it clear that peace had two aspects: peace with Pakistan and peace with Taliban.

We discussed the common opportunities and threats. We made it very clear to the Pakistani side that a new window of opportunity has opened and depending on the capacity and the will of the Pakistani leadership to change the window into a door and then to an alley and even a highway, or shut it all together.

Over the past ten months, we have persistently shown that Afghanistan has both the will and enough capacity to this end. We have shared intelligence with the Pakistani side so that both could carry out a comprehensive and targeted anti-terrorism campaign to rid our nations of violence. We waited all this long for Pakistan to demonstrate its will through action.

However, Pakistan still remains a venue and ground for gatherings from which mercenaries send us messages of war. The incidents of the past two months in general and the recent days in particular show that the suicide training camps and the bomb making facilities used to target and murder our innocent people still operate, as in the past, in Pakistan. Just as the incident in Peshawar and the killing of hundreds of innocent children in a school became a turning point in Pakistan, the recent incidents in Kabul and other provinces are no less and we call it a turning point for Afghanistan.

Our righteousness has been proven and everyone in the region knows we made all sincere efforts for peace. The decisions that Pakistani government will be making in the next few weeks will be as significant to affect bilateral relations for the next decades. The security of our people and the national interests of Afghanistan lay the basis of our relationship with Pakistan. We can no longer tolerate to see our people bleeding in a war exported and imposed on us from outside.

In my conversation last night, Pakistan Prime Minister pledged to direct his government to chart out an action plan against terrorism and to discuss and decide on its implementation during a trip by an Afghan delegation in the coming Thursday.

We hoped for peace, but war is declared against us from Pakistani territory; this in fact puts into a display a clear hostility against a neighboring country.

I ask the government and people of Pakistan to imagine that a terrorist attack just like the one in Kabul’s Shah Shahid area took place in Islamabad and the groups behind it had sanctuaries in Afghanistan and ran offices and training centers in our big cities, what would have been your reaction? Will you have looked at us as friends or enemies?

I would like to call on those Taliban who do not want their country destroyed and their people killed, to quit the ranks of criminals and insurgents and to reintegrate into their society. Today, the resources that should have been spent on building factories, hospitals and on other development projects are spent for defense and fighting a war exported to us by others.

The people of Afghanistan are all Muslims, so Islam is not the issue in this war. The political system in Afghanistan is based on the religion of Islam, and all the research shows that the Constitution of Afghanistan compared to those in the neighborhood, is enriched with Islamic values and ideas. Islamic scholars believe that having a system, even weak and rife with defects, is a lot better than not having a system at all. Islam is a religion of peace and stability. According to Islamic Sharia, anyone engaged in acts to destabilize and wreck security in a society and kill Muslims, is described as insurgent and warmonger.

Again, the main question is how can those who claim to have been acting on Sharia can be this careless to the massacre of the innocent people? What would be their response to Aya 32, Sora Almaida of the Holy Quran which says, “Whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land – it is as if he had slain mankind entirely.”?

There will be no flexibility of any kind with the criminals. We have directed the courts and the judicial authorities to show no leniency with those who have our people’s blood on their hand and those who respond the peace call with war and criminality will undoubtedly receive maximum punishment.

We very well know who stands in the way peace and why they do so. Whoever is engaged in criminality, narcotics, and atrocities, and whoever works for the outsiders to destroy Afghanistan is the enemy of peace. Such people fear peace, they fear rule of law and fear a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. Experience has shown that whenever there is a chance for peace, enemies are irritated and resort to violence and brutality. However, we have not and will not allow any such acts to deter us from our quest for peace or to force us into giving warmongers any concessions. We will make peace only with those who believe in the meaning of being a human, Muslim and Afghan and who do not destroy their own country on order from foreign masters.

I call on and request our politicians to do their utmost to keep this nation together at this critical juncture and to refrain from any actions that spread suspicions and disunity from which enemy may benefit.

Very luckily, Afghan youth are more willing today than ever to join the ranks of their country’s armed forces. Consistent to the demand, we have also adjusted and increased our recruitment volume up to 9 percent.

Let me conclude by a last remark on the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Our relation with Pakistan is based on our national interests, on top of which comes security and safety of our people. If our people continue to be killed, relations lose meaning and I hope it will not happen.

Thank you

Dr. Ashraf Ghani

05 augusti
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Jag är varken irani eller pakistani, jag är baluch (baloch) من بلوچـــم نه پاکستانی يا ايرانی

Hämtad från Facebook sidan ”Kommittén för Afghanistans unga balucher”

Jag är varken irani eller pakistani, jag är baluch (baloch)

Min etnicitet är baluch (baloch), mitt vackra land är Baluchistan (Balochistan) och mitt söta modersmål är baluchi (balochi). Jag är baluch (baloch). Den är min identitet. Öst baluchistan fick sin självständighet innan Pakistan fick sin självständighet (20 sep 1947) men blev ockuperad av den pakistanske armén redan i mars 1948. Samma armé som var efterlämning av den gamla kolonialmakten, Storbritannien och som hade lämnats i arv till den nyskapta landet Pakistan. Pakistan som var den illegitima sonen till den gamla kolonialmakten England kunde genom rävspel från Ali Jennah och partiet Muslim League ockupera mitt lands östra del och som blev annekterat av Pujab och indiska migranter. Samma armé som begått många brott i Bangladesh, därav 3 miljoner bengalier som massmördades på ett bestialiskt sätt för att Pakistan ska kunna behålla det gamla landet Bengal under det artificiella namnet ”Östpakistan” och under blodiga klorna av Punjab och indiska migranter. Men bengaliska nationen genom sin självständighet och frigörelse av sitt fädernesland år 1971 utfärdade dödsdomen av det krossade landet Pakistan. Utan hjälp från England och det konstgjorde landet Iran till Ali Bhuttos sönderslagna land, den misslyckade staten Pakistan skulle med säkerhet suddas från världskartan i början på 70-talet. Den ockuperade Baluchistan redan från början var ute efter sin självständighet. Men Mohammad Reza Pahlavi mycket stressad kom till Pakistans hjälp och genom sin luftvärn med Punjabs djuriska armé slog de sönder och blodigt mitt land för att mitt land skulle bli kvar under grymheter av bestialiska punjabier och de nyrika indiska migranter för att den okontrollerade persiska fascismen skulle kunna lättare nå sina människorättskränkande mål i mitt lands västra del.

Ja, jag är baluch varken irani eller pakistani. Mina förfärder och mitt lands hjältar är Mir Abdullah Khan, Mir Mehrab Khan, Yosuf Aziz Magasi, Mir Abdul Aziz Kord, Mir Abdul Karim Khan, Mir Nawroz Khan, Mir Gul Khan Nasir, Mir Gulam Mohammad Baluch. Brottslinga som Mohammad Ali Jennah (skaparen av Pakistan), Ayub Khan Patan, Yahya Khan, Reza Mir Panj, Ziaul Haq, Khomeini av indisk ätt, Sayed Ali Rawzakhwan och General Musharaf indisk immigrant är mitt lands och mitt folks fiender.

Civilisationslösa persiska fascister och bestialiska punjabier har ockuperat mitt land. De har dödat otaliga baluchier på olika sätt, hat slängt de i djupa brunnar och tagit livet av tusenals och åter tusentals baluchier för att stjäla mitt lands resurser och auktionera bort mitt lands gruvor. Pars (Iran, fars) och Punjab är två geografiska grannar som är icke önskade grannar som båda tar priset när det gäller grymheter, landstölder, bestialiteter. I mitt lands, Baluchistans, historia för första gången är samtidigt under blodiga klorna av Pars (Fars) och Punjab och om Gud vill är det även sista gången. Jag accepterar inte slaveri under Punjabiska fascister och vara fängslad under Pars (Fars) så kallade ”lands integritet”. För att återfå min nations rätt som har stulits, för att befria mitt land och den totala självständigheten för Baluchistan (Balochistan) går jag framåt.

Jag är varken Pakistani eller iran, jag är baluch (baloch).

Mohammad Karim Baluch (Baloch)

گرفته شده از صفحه فیسبوک انجمن جوانان بلوچ افغانستان

من بلوچـــم نه پاکستانی يا ايرانی

مليتــم بلـــوچ،  گلزمين وطنم بلوچستــان و زبان مادريم شهدين بلوچــی است. من بلوچـــم. همين اســت هويــت من. بلوچستـان شرقی قبل از تشکيل کشـور پاکستان به استقـلال رسيد ( يازدهم اوت ۱۹۴۷ ميلادی ) اما در ماه مارس۱۹۴۸ بوسيله ارتش پاکستان اشغال شد. ارتشی که باقيمانده نيروهای نظامی  استعمارپير انگليس در شرق هند بود و به کشور تازه تاسيس پاکستان  به ارث رسيد. … آری پاکستان که در واقع فرزند نامشروع استعمار پير انگليس است با دسيسه چينی های علی جناح و مسلم ليگ  بخش شرقی وطنم را زير سيطره ارتش پاکستان، پنجاب ومهاجرين هندی درآورد. ارتشی که دربنگلادش جنايتها آفريد، بيش ازسه ميليون  بنگالی را وحشيانه قتل عام کرد تا سرزمين تاريخی بنگال را تحت نام ساختگی « پاکستان شرقی» زيرچنگال خونين پنجاب و مهاجرين هندی نگه دارد. اما ملتبنگال با رهايی واستقلال سرزمين اجدادی خويش حکم مرگ کشور ورشکسته پاکستان را در سال۱۹۷۱  ميلادی صادر کرد. بـدون کمکهای انگليس و کشور قلابی ايران به دولت ورشکسـته علی بهٹــو کشور ناکام پاکستان يقينا درنيمه اول دهه هفتاد ميلادی از نقشه جهان محو می شـد. بلوچستــان اشغالی درهمان دوران درحال احيای استقلال ملی بود. اما محمد رضا پهلوی با سراسيمگی به کمک پاکستان ورشکستـه شتافت ونيروی هواييش همراه با ارتش ددمنش پنجاب سرزمينم را با خاک وخون يکسان کرد تا زيرستم پنجابيهای ددصفـت ومهاجرين نوکيسه هندی بمانـد وفاشيسم لجام گسيخته پارس دربخش غربی گلزمينم  راحت تربه اهداف  ضدبشـری خود برسـد.

آری من بلوچــم نه پاکستانی يا ايرانی. نياکانم و قهرمانان ملتم ميرعبدالله خان، مير مهراب خان، يوسف عزيز مگسـی ، مير عبددالعزير کورد، ميرعبدالکريم خان، ميرنوروزخان، ميرگل خان نصير، ميرگلام محمد بلوچ هستند.  جنايتکارانی از قبيل محمد علی جناح، ايوب خان پٹــان، يحيی خان، رضـا ميرپنج،  ضياالحق، خمينی هندی الاصل، سيدعلی روضه خوان و  ژنرال مشـرفِ مهاجــر دشمنان سرزمين و ملتم هستند. اين جنايتکاران جنگی قاتلان ملت بلوچهستند که با اعمال ضدانسانی  روح بشريـت را چنان جريحه دار کرده اند کـه تاريخ بشريت از ذکر نام شان  شرمسار است.

فاشيستهای بی تمدن پارس و ددمنشان پنجابی سرزمينم را اشغال کرده اند، بيشماران بلــوچ را وحشيانه بخاک و خون کشانده ،  به سياهچالها انداخته وزندگی هزاران هزار بلــوچ را به فلاکت کشانده اند تا سرمايه های ملی ملتم را به يغما ببرند و بر معادن و معادن وطنم چوب حراج بزنند. پارس و پنجاب ناهمسايه ترين همسايگان جغرافيايی هستنـد که جفت شان در تماميت خواهی، سبعيت و توحش ازهم ديگرسبقت می گيرند. در طول تاريخ وطنم  بلوچستــــــان برای اولين بار همزمان زير چنگالهای خونين پارس و پنجاب هست  و ان شالله آخرين بار خواهــد بود. بندگی فاشيستهای پنجابی و اسارت در « تماميت ارضی » تماميت خواهان پارس را هرگز قبـول نخواهم کرد. برای گرفتن حقوق از دست رفته ملتـم، برای رهايی وطنم وتحقق کامل استقــلال  بلوچستانــم آگاهانه به پيش می روم.

من بلوچـــم نه پاکستانی يا ايرانی. پروشت ءُ پــروش باتنـت ايران ءُ پاکستـان آزات ءُ آبــــــاد بات گنجيـــــں بلوچستــــــان

محمــد کـريــم بلـــوچ